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ARA/LA - Mr. Crimmins

December 7, 1971

Jack -

You have asked me to be more specific as to what steps I would take in carrying out the recommendations set forth in "What Is To Be Done - In Chile", of November, 1970, and "A Plan for More Effective U.S. Anti-Communist Action in Latin America", of May, 1971. Eleven specific steps are briefly listed below. Several of them were included in the May, 1971 paper, and all of them should be read in that context. They are merely a few examples of what needs to be done in a major, coordinated, low profile effort to counter growing Soviet and indigenous Communist influence in L.A.

- 1. Identify influential groups and individuals in each country which are working with the Communists, or are their potential allies, and make a determined, long range, low key, effort to attract as many as possible away from the Communists.

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[Redacted]

Rather, the main thought here is to try to make such elements (Socialists, Radicals, Christian Democrats, leftist priests, teachers, etc.) realize, among other things: 1) that the USG does not favor the status quo, does favor the political, economic and social democratization of L.A., is not indiscriminately anti-leftist, etc.; and, 2) that they have a better chance to come to power and/or to achieve their goals if they are not allied with the Communists. This effort should be made both here and in the field. Our tactics would include personal contact, indirect contact (e.g. between one L.A. leftist and another), and appropriate USG policies, programs and statements designed to give credibility to our efforts and to achieve this specific objective.

- 2. Ascertain the most effective Communist arguments against us in L.A., develop the most effective responses, and make certain that they are used - here as well as in the field.

- 3. Determine the most effective anti-Communist arguments and materials in Latin America and use them in white, black and gray dissemination. Such material would include, among many

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E.O. 13292, Sec. 3.5
NLJ/LIS 06-87
By cbm, NARA, Date 12-19-06

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other things, translations of excellent Polish, Hungarian, Soviet, etc., on the spot documentation of how Communism actually operates in Eastern and Central Europe.

4. Prepare a series of speeches for Nixon, Meyer, Crimmins, etc., primarily designed to reduce Communist influence in L.A., but without indicating that such is the purpose. Give heavy play to those speeches.

5. Evaluate the effectiveness of our FSOs and other personnel in debate with Communist or pro-Communist representatives in front of Latin American audiences with a high percentage of those leftist elements mentioned in Point 1. If our officers need training and/or guidance, give it to them. If this recommendation seems pointless I suggest such a debate be arranged, perhaps in front of L.A. students in Washington.

6. Undertake an organized, off the record campaign to reach and influence some of the key leftist artists, writers, etc., whose names we have just collected for that purpose (without having revealed our objective in INR, CIA or the field).

7. Discover what the VOA is saying in broadcasts to Latin America. Determine whether those broadcasts can be made more effective for anti-Communist purposes.

8. Review a number of our individual actions, statements, programs, and policies, to judge whether, on balance, they have been harmful or helpful to the Communists. For example, we might evaluate from this viewpoint our present public posture and image vis-a-vis the Brazilian Government.

9. Prepare a list of specific USG policies, measures and programs (political, economic and social) which would be most effective against the Communists in L.A., determine which of them we could realistically urge be approved and implemented now or within the near future, and estimate the political cost to the USG of non-implementation.

10. Review our present labor policies and tactics to determine whether they can be made more effective against the Communists, and if so, how.

11. Identify those non-Communist elements in the U.S. which are most useful to the Communists in L.A. and attempt to influence their thinking, diminish their usefulness, etc.

Conclusion

The foregoing, and a good many more, are readily identifiable steps which we should be taking against the Communist threat in L.A. But there are others which will become apparent through an activist approach to the daily message traffic, the press, FBIS, and what the Party likes to call "real life". The following are six examples from my own experience (I would like to go over them with you, with documentation from my files):

1. In February, 1966 I sent a cable to Rio calling attention to a Soviet Portuguese language broadcast which was strongly critical of the GOB. I urged that the Embassy inform the GOB, and I arranged to fly the tape recording of the broadcast to Rio for replay in the Foreign Office. As a direct result the GOB expelled a Soviet official on 48 hours notice.

2. I first met de Leon Schlotter at a CICOP meeting in St. Louis. He was filled with criticism, much of it inaccurate, of the USG. I gave him my Spanish language pamphlet, "U.S. Foreign Policy - Sterile Anti-Communism?". After reading it and talking with me he asked why, if what I said was true, the C.D. had been excluded from our Guatemala Embassy's reception for Covey Oliver. I prevailed on de Leon Schlotter to come here on his way back to Guatemala and arranged a long session with Covey. Covey made clear he had not known of the C.D. exclusion, that we were not anti-C.D., etc. Our relations with the Guatemalan C.D. improved.

3. In late 1966 and January 1967 a number of reports rumored guerrilla preparations in Bolivia. I had misgivings concerning the ARA evaluation that these rumors were planted

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by the GOB to obtain more U.S. military equipment. On January 20, 1967, I drafted a letter to La Paz, asking the Embassy for their opinion as to a possible guerrilla danger, their estimate of GOB alertness, etc. The Guevara band struck its first blow on March 23. The Embassy replied to my letter shortly thereafter.

4. After Pete Vaky returned from his tour as DCM in Guatemala I questioned him closely about my misgivings regarding indiscriminate right wing terror in Guatemala, our policy and tactics, etc. Pete finally confided that my suspicions were justified and that he regretted not having stood up to Ambassador Mein concerning our position on the terror. I prevailed upon Pete to level with Covey, in writing. Our policy and tactics changed soon thereafter.

5. Soon after several Cubans defected at the Pan American Games, in Cali, I became concerned over their whereabouts and disposition, especially because of their political-propaganda importance. As the defectors were shunted around they became the bureaucratic responsibility of the Desk Officer of whatever country they were in. When it became evident that we had lost track of the Cubans I urged that we find them, make sure they were well cared for, and permit them to come to the U.S. if they so desired. We finally discovered the defectors in Panama - in jail. They are now in the U.S.

6. After a long and intense debate with a group of Chilean student representatives, including Socialists, Communists and Christian Democrats, the leader of the group, an Allende supporter, presented me with the Chilean copper ash tray which now sits on my desk. Another L.A. response to a similar session is attached.

Attachment a/s

ARA - G. Lister